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Contingency and the Order of Nature 
Nancy Cartwright 
Durham University and UCSD 
 
 
PART I SETTING THINGS UP 
 
Introduction 
 
This is a paper in defence of radical contingency in Nature, radical contingency 
despite the pockets of rough order we observe in our daily lives and of precise 
order we report in our modern sciences. But, are contingency and order not in 
opposition? Yes, I think they are.... if the view of Nature and science that has 
dominated since the Scientific Revolution is correct, that order arises from the 
rule of universal laws, laws that hold everywhere and everywhen and that 
dictate all aspects of what happens.  But they are not in conflict if the source of 
order in Nature is not laws but powers and mechanisms.  
 
I have been arguing for the importance of powers (which I have called 
capacities) and mechanisms (which I have called nomological machines) for a 
long time and I have my own slant on just how to describe them. But these are 
both central topics in philosophy now, powers primarily for the metaphysicians 
and mechanisms in the philosophy of science, and there are a variety of 
different accounts available. No matter. Almost any of the variations can be 
adapted to the image of Nature where laws play a minimal role, powers rule, 
physics is incomplete, the future is open and what occurs in Nature can be a 
matter of mere hap.  
 
I have argued against universal laws as the correct way to reconstruct our 
impressive body of knowledge in modern science and in favour of powers 
instead in a number of different ways. The basic attitude behind all the 
arguments is a metaphysical modesty: postulate what is needed and don't 
make grand gestures beyond this. Powers make sense of the practices of much 
modern science and of its impressive empirical successes. They allow us to 
account for any order that we have actually observed or established without 
signing up to faith that all is ordered everywhere and that physics is Queen of 
all of Nature. Finally, powers allow for a this-worldly metaphysics in which 
Nature, once created, moves forward of its own accord; what happens next is 
governed from within Nature and not by some mysterious laws that dwell 
outside and operate by some extra-natural force. 
 
In this paper I shall argue that embracing contingency and deriving order from 
powers and mechanisms resolves 3 distinct kinds of problems in one fell 
swoop: ontological, theological and epistemological. The theological is in 
honour of our conference organiser, Peter Harrison, whose work provides the 
starting point for it. The ontological problem is one adumbrated before and the 
dimensions of it will be familiar to all here.  But the epistemological problem is, 
I believe, relatively unfamiliar. I take it from the recently deceased German 
philosopher of physics and friend, Erhard Scheibe.      
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I begin by outlining the view about powers, mechanisms and contingency that 
I maintain will solve the three problems I will describe. 
 
 
Powers and mechanisms 
 
So, what's a power? I don't think the lens of modern science is strong enough 
to show an answer, which I take it is why contemporary metaphysics has taken 
up that job. Happily for present purposes it is enough just to note a handful of 
features that I argue we had best ascribe to powers and their mode of 
operation if we are to account for at least a large swathe of the practices and 
impressive empirical successes of our modern sciences. 
 
1. Powers are identified by a canonical operation. For example gravity is the 
power to attract objects of mass m a distance r away with a force Gm/r2. 
 
2. Our modern sciences have empirically established a very great number of 
powers. Some are the result of stable arrangements of components with 
other powers: e.g. the power of objects identifiable as toasters to brown 
bread depends on the arrangement and familiar powers of its parts. But we 
cannot assume that all powers 'reduce' to arrangements of some basic set. 
Each science produces knowledge of myriads of special powers that relate in 
complicated ways to other powers. And where reductions are possible, the 
lessons of the 'mechanists' in contemporary philosophy of causation (like 
Bechtel and Machamer, Darden and Craver) must be heeded: arrangements 
matter, not just the powers of the parts. 
 
3. Modern sciences also have empirically established a myriad of reliable 
indicators of powers:  Any system with a gravitational mass has the power 
of gravitational attraction; experts can tell a barley seed from rye and oat 
by their visible characteristics; I know the object in the box in the shop will 
brown bread because it is labelled 'toaster'. (The metaphysical relation 
between the indicators and the powers is a matter of current controversy.) 
 
4. What happens when a power operates in its canonical manner depends on 
the arrangement of circumstances: When the earth exerts its gravitational 
power on a compact unsupported object in a vacuum, the object falls at 32 
ft/sec/sec; when (to use an example of Otto Neurath) it exerts its 
gravitational attraction on a 1000 mark note dropped on a windy day in St 
Stephen's square, the bill blows all over the place; when it exerts it on a 
glass sitting on a table, the glass sits still. 
 
5. Some arrangements of circumstances fix what will result when the 
components exercise their powers in consort. Successful design will 
engineer these arrangements to produce the kinds of results we want. 
Some arrangements of the right sort to fix results occur naturally and these 
are the sources of predictability in Nature. In other cases we have no 
guarantee that the results are fixed. 
3 
 
 
6. The impressive precise predictive success of modern physics as well as the 
phenomenal technological advances that physics has aided can (as I shall 
describe in more detail in Part IV) be accounted for by ‘local mechanisms’ 
without resort to universal laws that fix all of the effects in physics’ domain. 
 
7. The possibilities for new reliably predictable behaviours by engineering new 
mechanisms are endless. 
 
This last is what is so exhilarating about replacing the rule of universal law with 
a power/mechanism ontology if correct. Nothing in our future is set 
irredeemably by what happened at the Big Bang or at some hyper-surface in 
space time. What happens can depends on how we arrange things to exploit 
the powers of their parts. 
 
The place for radical contingency is found in number 5. It is here that others 
adopt a faith in determinism whereas I urge we remain agnostic, putting into 
Nature only what we need in order to account for what we know to be the 
case. I say that some arrangements fix what happens. We have strong 
empirical evidence for this much at least. Moreover in different fields of 
knowledge we can say quite a lot about what the arrangements are like that 
provide fixed outcomes that we know, at least roughly, how to predict. But the 
empirical evidence stops far short of the stronger conclusion of determinism: 
that every arrangement has a fixed outcome. (Or, with quantum mechanics in 
view, a fixed outcome space with fixed probabilities across it.) Some things 
just happen. Powers operate in their usual way but circumstances are not right 
for a fixed outcome.  
 
This is how Nature appears to us much of the time, especially Nature in the 
wild, outside of our technologies, our societies and our laboratories, and it is 
how it continues in some cases to appear despite our best scienti fic efforts to 
uncover the hidden rules we take to be fixing its every outcome. What happens 
may be constrained in ways we have come to learn about -- it is fairly certain 
that the thousand mark note in St Stephen's Square will not suddenly turn into 
a giraffe. But the evidence that secures that prediction does not go far enough 
to assure that just where the bill lands is fixed by law given the circumstances. 
You may if you wish have faith in determinism just as I have a strong aesthetic 
preference for a dappled and open-ended world. But in either case it would be 
a mistake to maintain that the evidence selects one view over the other. At 
least the dappled, open-ended world where powers, not laws, operate, has this 
in its favour: It involves less metaphysical commitment and the metaphysics it 
does embrace is this-worldly, and, if I am right in my arguments here, it 
provides as side benefits help on pressing problems in theology, ontology and 
the epistemology of science. 
 
 
 
 
PART II  SOME ONTOLOGICAL ADVANTAGES 
4 
 
 
The usual story has it not only that Nature is ruled by universal laws but that 
these laws govern only a special set of basic features. These features and laws 
are the special domain of physics. What then of all the other features we find 
in the world around us, from the central theoretical quantities studied in other 
disciplines to the everyday features by which we organise our lives?  
 
Philosophers nowadays offer two accounts. One, which is very visible in the 
literature on mind-body relations, involves supervenience and multiple 
realisability. The microphysical state of the universe determines all the other 
features that hold in the sense that were the microphysical states different, 
these other features would have to differ as well. The reverse though is not the 
case. The same set of non-physics feature can be realised by a variety of 
different physics states. 
 
The other, which I think is preferable for reasons I shall explain, proposes that 
there are what philosophers of science call ‘reductions’: There is a physics state 
to correspond to certain other stable features of Nature and the laws that 
govern the basic features of physics explain why these other features exhibit 
whatever regular behaviour they do exhibit. 
 
We are told that modern physics provides empirical support for the 
metaphysical claim I question, that the non-physics features and regularities of 
Nature are fixed by law once the initial physics features are laid down. Yet 
physics does not provide even a rough sketch, let alone a proper account, of 
how this works for any features at all. But there are those who are committed 
to the effort, for instance the physicist turned philosopher of physics David 
Albert, who says of himself: ‘My research is focused mainly on questions of 
whether and how physics might amount to a fundamental and universal 
account of the entirety of nature.’1  
 
Much of the effort in this regard by Albert and other physicists and 
philosophers focuses on reconciling the second law of thermodynamics, 
whereby systems evolve towards ‘equilibrium’ – heat flows from hot to cold, 
gases expand throughout their available volume – with the fact that for any 
sequence of states that the basic laws of physics allow, they allow the 
sequence in reverse temporal order as well. The conventional manoeuvre here 
is first, following the ideas of Ludwig Boltzmann, to make some probability 
assumptions whereby the set of microstates evolving towards macroscopic 
equilibrium is far more probable than the set evolving away from equilibrium, 
and second, to postulate – note, postulate, not discover – a very special 
starting state of very ‘low entropy’, i.e. very far away from equilibrium. How 
far away? As Craig Callender remarks: ‘How low would the entropy have to be? 
Real low: low enough to make thermodynamic generalizations applicable for 
the roughly 15 billion years we think these generalizations held. ’2 
                                                 
1 http://philocosmology.rutgers.edu/who-we-are/david-albert Published on 07 February 2012 
2 Measures, Explanations and the Past:  
Should “Special” Initial Conditions Be Explained? 
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That’s about as good as it gets when it comes to detailed models of how the 
regular behaviours of other features in Nature come about from the initial 
physics features of the universe: We can give a transcendental argument 
about what the initial conditions must have been if the special feature ‘entropy’ 
is to behave as we observe it to behave. And even this claim is way 
overstated. Even if successful, all these arguments do is to show that the 
entropy of the universe as a whole goes in the right direction. But what we 
observe is not the whole but a very great many of the parts. In each of these 
local systems we observe, from our coffee cooling in our cups to the gas 
escaping from the punctured balloon, entropy increases. It is perfectly 
compatible with the global entropy going up that all the subsystems on Earth 
have their entropy go down.  
 
This issue links with Scheibe ’s worries about coherence and generality that I 
discuss in Part IV. As Calendar remarks in personal correspondence:3 ‘One gets 
pushed "global" by backward time evolving the particles making up 
your coffee and the probability distribution over them.  Those guys came 
from the water from the tap, which came from the lake, which came 
from....the formation of oxygen and hydrogen...  So the transcendental 
argument pushes one not just all the way back but all the way "wide."  Make 
that global posit.  Nothing in particular follows about that coffee cup.  Or at 
least, one needs to wave one’s hands a lot making various huge controversial 
and unverifiable assumptions about the dynamics for anything to follow at all.’ 
In Part IV I explain why we needn’t get pushed global in our laws just because 
the water comes from the tap that comes from the lake…. since little of this 
history happens in the context of a mechanism in which the laws can take 
control and dictate outcomes.   
 
We do enormously better though when it comes to providing local physics 
substructures that explain particular kinds of regular behaviours, what I above 
called ‘reductions’. This is why I prefer reduction to supervenience. ‘I believe it 
when I see it’ and urge the same for you. And there are lots of empirically 
well-supported reductions (but see my caveats on this below) of particular 
special features to be seen in the natural sciences. One I have studied is 
provided by the BCS theory of superconductivity. The BCS theory proposes 
that superconductors are materials in which a sea of electrons float in a certain 
kind of lattice structure. The theory then deploys a combination of quantum 
and classical mechanics to show that materials with this structure will exhibit 
the two central characterising behaviours of a superconductor: They expel 
magnetic fields and they allow for the flow of DC electricity without resistance. 
 
Providing this explanation is an enormous achievement. But it is a very very 
long way from showing how each expulsion of the magnetic field by an 
operating superconductor was destined by the initial conditions of the universe. 
I have no doubt that there are good historical explanations to be had, and 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Craig Callender 
3 31 July 2013 
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similar ones at that probably, about how each and every sample of lead or 
cadmium or zinc comes to be the way it is, e.g. how zinc sulphides in Lisheen, 
county Tipperary, Ireland, in which the zinc will have what is called a ‘body 
centred cubic’ lattice structure, resulted from mineralogical changes in the host 
lime mud limestones. But this kind of explanation will involve local 
arrangements of a mix of causes, including geological forces, that act in 
cooperation with the microstructures of the more original materials from which 
the sulphides formed.  
 
There are three points I want to make from this discussion. First, the BCS 
theory helps provide a good explanation4 of a new feature – being a 
superconductor – and of its regular behaviour – when cooled below the 
transition temperature a superconductor expels magnetic fields and allows for 
resistanceless flow of DC electricity – that involves features of fundamental 
physics and their known behaviours. But the explanation does not involve 
deriving those regular behaviours from the state of physics features at the 
start of the universe. The explanation is given by describing a mechanism: an 
arrangement of parts with powers that can be taken to constitute a new 
feature – being a superconductor – that exhibits regular behaviour. 
 
I say that the parts have powers that, when exercised in consort in the specific 
arrangement described in the theory, produce the two effects regularly 
associated with being a superconductor. I suppose many would accept that the 
explanation proceeds by describing a mechanism but insist that the operation 
of the mechanism depends on laws not powers. This is of course a matter of 
reconstruction: Which is the better metaphysics to describe the knowledge 
used in these accounts and what counts as ‘better’? For me a ‘good’ 
metaphysics for the job will be this-worldly; it will have solid empirical 
warrant; and it will not stretch its neck out much farther than necessary. 
That’s why I choose powers.  
 
I also think, as I argue in Part IV following Erhard Scheibe, that there are 
consistency problems about these laws given what we know of how interactive 
the systems in Nature are. I picture our knowledge of how charges repel and 
attract each other, which is central to the explanation for superconducting 
regularities, as knowledge about the canonical operation of the powers to repel 
and attract that charged objects have. If it is instead to be cast as knowledge 
of laws, just what do the laws say, and how do you show that what they 
dictate is consistent with what is dictated by law from the initial conditions of 
the universe? 
 
Second, although for the sake of illustration I have talked as if the BCS theory 
reduces superconducting materials and their behaviour to some set of 
fundamental physics features, I have never seen a serious model that accounts 
in this way for real phenomena that take place at a specific place and time. All 
the models I know that describe and predict the behaviours of real objects, 
                                                 
4 Though there is some question whether it is the ‘right’ explanation since it does not extend to high temperature 
superconductivity, for which we are having a hard time finding a good theory. 
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from superconductors to lasers to gyroscopes testing the general theory of 
relativity (GTR), involve a host of features not in this privileged set and not 
otherwise reduced to them. The BCS theory looks as if it does because it is an 
abstract model; it is a template that we deploy as a central part, but only part, 
of detailed models of mechanisms that we use to make real empirical 
predictions. This kind of template is not what we use for the precise on-the-
ground predictions about real systems that make credible the knowledge 
claims of modern physics. Rather we use a model that deploys a very rich set 
of concepts that allows us to describe and make predictions about a real 
material sunk into a real dewar to cool it below the transition temperature to 
employ, say, as part of a SQUID (a superconducting quantum interference 
device) to help measure the precession of a fused quartz sphere that will serve 
as a ‘gyroscope’ used to test GTR.  
 
The lesson is two-fold. All the models I know that produce the kinds of precise 
empirical predictions that give us well-grounded faith in physics ’ knowledge 
look like detailed descriptions of mechanisms and they use a host of features 
of various kinds at various ‘levels’ related in diverse and complicated ways. If 
we take seriously that we should accept into our ontology what we use in our 
best empirically predictive models, we will end up with a rich ontology of 
features and not the sparse set of special quantities that physics specialises in.   
 
Third, we are also able in modern science to explain the appearance of 
features and behaviours, even microphysical features – like the formation 
lattices in zinc sulphides in Lisheen – that don’t come close to looking like 
reductions to physics, though physics may play a role in the account. As I 
noted above, these explanations look like descriptions of mechanisms, and in 
these cases even more so than in those that approach reductions, if we read 
our ontology from our explanatory and predictive success, it will look nothing 
like an ontology of physics features. 
 
A metaphysics of powers and mechanisms will thus allow us a world rich in 
features that relate in just the ways we see them relate in our successful 
predictive and explanatory models, features that do not have to be accounted 
for in models that we don’t have even sample of by the laws of physics 
evolving the initial conditions of the universe.  
 
 
 
PART III A THEOLOGICAL ADVANTAGE 
 
Peter Harrison has argued that historically the doctrine of the universal rule of 
Nature and all within it by immutable law that has dominated since the 
Scientific Revolution made the secularisation of Nature easier. On the dominant 
view God laid down the laws and the initial circumstances of the world and, 
supposing the laws are obeyed, all else follows. There is recurring debate 
about whether God is needed to keep reaffirming the entire set up to keep it in 
existence but if He is not needed, there is no role for God once the world has  
been created. But then, why suppose there is a God to create it? God is an 
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unexplained explainer. Why not just stop one step sooner: The laws 
themselves and the initial state are together the final unexplained explainer. 
So the rule of universal law makes God appear unnecessary. 
 
I would like to suggest that, equally, it makes God appear unattractive, indeed 
sinister. Logically it is a short step from universal determinism to the denial of 
free will for humans and the Calvinist doctrine of predestination. The argument 
about free will is familiar to us all. All that happens in Nature -- including all 
our actions and their consequences -- are dictated by the rule of immutable 
law from the initial state in which the world began. If so, it seems not only 
unjust but cruel to punish us for our failings.  
 
Some thinkers, like the English Anglican Puritan, Thomas Beard, who taught 
Oliver Cromwell, have argued that God foreordained everything including the 
fall of human kind. (See his ‘Theatre of God’s Judgments’). Others give 
humanity more responsibility. We are responsible for our fall from grace but 
God foreordained everything after the fall, including people’s actions and lives 
and ultimately then heaven and hell for each of us. In the first model, God still 
reacts to circumstance, in the second he does not. Scholars disagree about 
which of these Calvin himself believed. Whichever was Calvin's own view the 
first model got gradually replaced by the second over the early modern period, 
essentially because of a following through on the logic of divine sovereignty. 
People start out thinking about predestination in the context of questions about 
salvation but then it becomes our familiar cosmological question.  
 
We can see the difference by looking at descriptions of predestination in 
different Calvinist statements of faith. For instance, compare 
 
Belgic Confession of Faith 1561 
‘We believe that all the posterity of Adam, being thus fallen into 
perdition and ruin by the sin of our first parents, God then did 
manifest himself such as he is; that is to say, merciful and just: Merciful, 
since he delivers and preserves from this perdition all whom he, in his 
eternal and unchangeable council, of mere goodness hath elected in 
Christ Jesus our Lord, without respect to their works: Just, in leaving 
others in the fall and perdition wherein they have involved themselves. ’ 
(Art. XVI) 
with 
The Westminster Confession of Faith (1643) 
 
'God from all eternity did by the most wise and holy counsel of 
his own will, freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes 
to pass; yet so as thereby neither is God the author of sin; nor is 
violence offered to the will of the creatures, nor is the liberty or 
contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established. 
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By the decree of God, for the manifestation of his glory, some men and 
angels are predestinated unto everlasting life, and others foreordained to 
everlasting death. 
 
As God hath appointed the elect unto glory, so hath He, by the eternal 
and most free purpose of His will, foreordained all the means thereunto. 
Wherefore, they who are elected . . . are effectually called unto faith in 
Christ by His Spirit working in due season, are justified, adopted, 
sanctified, and kept by His power. through faith, unto salvation. Neither 
are any other redeemed by Christ, effectually called, justified, adopted, 
sanctified, and saved, but the elect only. 
 
The rest of mankind God was pleased, according to the unsearchable 
counsel of His own will, whereby He extendeth or withholdeth mercy, as 
He pleaseth, for the glory of His Sovereign power over His creatures, to 
pass by; and to ordain them to dishonour and wrath for their sin, to the 
praise of His glorious justice.' (Chap. III — Articles I, III, VI and VII) 
 
 
When it comes to thinking about the character of God, the differences here can 
seem minor, almost insulting. Am I supposed to be comforted and convinced of 
God's beneficence and justness by the reassurance that I am not damned from 
the start for doing what I have no choice in but rather damned for doing what I 
have no choice in on account of the foolish or wicked behaviour of Adam and 
Eve? 
 
As with our contemporary attempts to reconcile free will with the universal and 
fundamental rule of the laws of physics and the assumption that all that  
happens in Nature supervenes on what happens in physics, there has been a 
lot of fancy footwork to try to explain just how it can be that everything is 
determined by the laws and initial conditions that God laid down but still 
'neither is God the author of sin; nor is violence offered to the will of the 
creatures, nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but 
rather established.' 
 
Nor is the theological problem just that God seems to allow us to be punished 
for what we did not genuinely do. Indeed even if one believes in universal 
salvation, the problem of human freedom still stands in the same relation to 
God’s will as in a picture where some are predestined to heaven, others to hell . 
Given the universal rule of law, we cannot do anything; we have no role to 
play in how the world unfolds. We are like the hammer that strikes the nail: 
We have no choice of which nail to strike, or to strike or not, let alone about 
whether we want to be a hammer or not. 
 
A more attractive God is the God of the 4th century Pelagius, defender of what 
came to be labelled the 'Pelagian heresy’, or the rather different God of the 
earlier Irenaeus. Both of these thinkers, in their different ways, give us 
resources for thinking about a God who not only leaves space for us to do 
things but encourages us to do our best. Pelagius admitted God ’s sovereignty 
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in the world as it unfolds but argued that it is sovereignty as potentiality in the 
sense that God can make his will occur, but he might not. God might want 
something to happen but nevertheless it may not because we don't make it 
happen. And Irenaeus, though a firm defender of divine sovereignty over 
creation, urged that people’s actions have to come from themselves in order to 
be genuinely moral acts and he insisted that we progress towards perfection. 
Admittedly both of these ideas can be found in a wide variety of patristic 
authors in some guise. However, for Irenaeus, they are both especially 
emphatic and especially calculated to draw out the importance of human 
agency. 
5 
The contingency of events that can be allowed once the universal rule of law is 
rejected can leave space for us to play an active role in what the world will 
come to be like. It is not of course enough by itself. If what happens just 
happens we have no more control than we do if all is fixed forever from the 
start. Powers too by themselves do not solve the problem. We may indeed 
have a myriad of powers but if they exercise themselves willy-nilly when the 
occasion is ripe, again we have no control. So it looks as if we need in addition 
some kind of doctrine of agency, like the one Tim Mawson among others 
defends: We are agents endowed not only with a variety of powers but also 
with the ability to exercise them to change arrangements in the world and to 
invent and set-up new arrangements with new previously undreamt of 
outcomes. 
 
This kind of doctrine is notoriously difficult to get right and I shall not make 
any attempt at it. My contribution here is to provide independent motivation 
for two of the three chief ingredients that allow us to play an active role in 
shaping Nature and in moulding the societies in which we live, by setting these 
problems in the philosophy of science, in the context of the attempt to provide 
a reasonable and not inflated this-worldly reconstruction of the scientific world 
image. In this context powers are widespread, they are not peculiar to human 
beings, and contingency is not motivated by the free will problem but rather it 
serves to avoid making grander metaphysical commitments than we need to 
account for the evidence about Nature provided by the empirical successes of 
our modern sciences. 
 
 
 
PART IV AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL ADVANTAGE6 
 
 
Erhard Scheibe argues that the more general our physical laws are, the less 
coherent or interconnected is the world that our theories picture. There is a 
'mutual exclusion “by degrees”' between generality and coherence.7 
                                                 
5 Reference to Mawson’s recent book 
6 Thanks to Tom Bunce who is responsible for the exegesis of Scheibe’s views. More details can be found in xx 
[Scheibe paper with TB] 
7 ref 
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Consider what a law of physics says. The law claims that all physical systems 
described by it behave in a certain manner – that described in the law. All 
hydrogen atoms, for example, behave in accordance with the Schrödinger 
equation with a Coulomb potential. By putting laws in this form we see that 
they have two components: 1) the content of the law, and 2) its universal 
form. 
 
The content of the law, according to Scheibe 'is what physicists have to find 
out by exploring nature'. It tells us about each individual system; the actual 
claim of the law -- its concrete content -- is different in the different cases that 
the law applies to. The universal form bestows onto a law the generality that 
makes it a law. The problem is that these two parts of a law work against each 
other. The generality of a law implies a certain kind of independence between 
the systems in the domain of its quantifier. Each of them individually should 
satisfy the law regardless of the state or situation of the others.  This 
independence between instances limits the establishment of lawlike 
connections/interactions between the physical systems in the domain of the 
law. Conversely the content of a theory can produce a connection among 
systems in the world of a strength that it disallows independence and 
universality. The kinds of interactions pictured in the theory might lead to an 
extreme coherence in which everything is related to everything else in such a 
way that no natural laws for the separate systems involved can be admitted. 
 
What then, is the coherence of a physical system like?  The picture of how the 
world operates presented in both classical and quantum physics introduces 
dependencies between otherwise independent subsets. Consider the contrast 
between the world in which there is no true reduction of a quantum wave-
packet – a world in which things have no individual state once they have 
interacted – and the world of logical atomism (as pictured for example in 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus)– a world in which each proposition can be true or 
false independently of any of the others. The former is maximally coherent; 
the latter minimally so. In the no-collapse quantum world there is only one 
state – the state of the entire world.  In the Tractarian world each and every 
constituent part has a state of its own independent of all of the other 
constituent parts and so coherence is minimized. 
 
Coherence has a different nature in classical physics since in classical physics 
each distinct system does have its own state despite interaction. But as soon 
as gravitational interaction is admitted the states do not evolve separately but 
only the entire collection at once. So again generality is completely lost. We 
can put a universal quantifier in front if we want. So we can SAY  of the 
temporal evolution of the state S of a physical system, ‘For all x, dS(x)/dt = 
….’. But there is really only one ‘x’ that this law governs. 
 
But that is not how we use our laws. We do picture the world as highly 
coherent: full of connections and interactions. Yet we apply our laws to sundry 
individual systems. Often this is defended with the excuse that we are merely 
idelaising in a harmless way.  Scheibe notes that as a consequence of this kind 
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idealisation, there is a 'radical and inevitable fictionalism' at work in physics – 
we abstract almost everything about the real world. This is inevitable, he 
argues. Otherwise it seems we would have to jump straight from knowing 
nothing to knowing everything.  
 
But this is not a trivial fact.  It imposes on the world and our theories of it the 
requirement that the behaviours that our theories predict to be physically 
possible should, even though viewed as different possible worlds, be realized in 
THIS world with sufficient accuracy and in sufficient numbers despite the fact 
that this world is full of interactions that destroy the requisite independence. 
Now this seems to be the case. We would not, Scheibe points out, have 
physics without it. The epistemological problem would be insurmountable.  
 
It is though a truly remarkable fact: If anything like our current understanding 
is correct, our world is highly coherent. So coherent that there may be only 
one system for the laws of evolution to govern. How do we learn this law, or 
confirm it? For sure it is not by looking at the only state the evolutionary laws 
care about – the state of the entire universe -- at different times. We learn the 
law of the whole by generalising the behaviour of the parts. For this to be 
possible the very laws – totally non-general laws -- that describe the behaviour 
of the whole must also describe the behaviours of the components in good 
approximation. How can that be so? This is the big question that Scheibe’s 
lessons about coherence and generality raise.  
 
How did we get so lucky? For the kind of fictionalising Scheibe describes to 
work, the fundamental law of evolution of the universe – the one true law, the 
only one there is – must have very special characteristics. Without it we 
couldn’t look at how the parts behave in certain peculiar circumstances – when 
they are ‘nearly isolated’ – and find the same regular behaviours and then 
extrapolate the behaviours we regularly see for the parts to be the law of the 
whole. In fact, there’s no reason even to think there would be any regular 
behaviour to be observed, even in ‘isolated’ parts. 
 
Let me give a simple diagrammatic example.  Consider gravitational attraction 
as we understand it in classical mechanics: Any mass M attracts any other 
mass m with force GMm/r2, where r is the separation between the centres of 
mass of the two. We learned this in part from observing the effect of the sun 
on the earth. But the earth is made up of myriad small morsels of mass. If the 
formula is true for all masses, as it is supposed to be, then each of these must 
be attracted to the sun with a force given by the same formula. In that case 
the earth as a whole must move as the motions of these morsels dictate and 
so, in train, must its centre of mass. Why should that result in a motion for the 
earth that looks anything like one in which the centre of mass of the earth is 
attracted to the sun by a force GMm/r2? The motion of the whole must follow 
willy-nilly from the motion of its parts and any force that we read out of that 
for the attraction between masses need look nothing at all like the true one 
that is at work. Yet we did look at the motion of the whole and read back a 
correct force both for it and for all its parts. How is this possible? 
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Answer: We are lucky, and on two counts. The distribution of matter making 
up the earth is very nearly spherically homogeneous and the force of 
gravitational attraction is a 1/r2 force. That’s terrific because for 1/r2 forces, if 
each morsel of a spherically homogeneous body is attracted to a spot with that 
force, so the centre of mass of the whole will also be attracted by the same 
force. Moreover, 1/r2 is the only form for which that is true. 
 
We must suppose the same kind of luck for the forms of the laws of the 
universe if we are to read these laws off from what we observe about the 
separate parts when their interaction is minimalized. Or beyond luck – a 
miraculous gift.   
 
The trade-off between coherence and generality that Scheibe highlights makes 
the possibility of our doing physics seem a miracle. The laws of the evolution of 
the universe must have a very special form indeed if we are to learn them in 
the way we do and if we are to use them in the way we do. But with a 
metaphysics of powers and mechanisms, we don’t need this miracle after all. 
There are no laws for the universe as a whole with which the laws of its parts 
must be reconciled. There are just the parts of Nature. The parts have powers 
and when parts with suitable powers are arranged in suitable ways – i.e. they 
constitute a mechanism -- outcomes may be fixed. This gives rise to a host of 
local necessities but there is no natural source of inconsistency among them. 
 
In defence of these claims I shall first review how we acquire knowledge of the 
physics of Nature on the powers/mechanisms account and how we use it, then 
make some brief remarks on Scheibe’s picture of the coherent universe.  
 
 
Sometimes we are able to study mechanisms – arrangements of parts -- in 
which a particular powers acts more or less on its own, so that we can see its 
canonical exercise directly in what happens. That’s what Galileo did in his 
rolling ball experiments to study the power of gravitational attraction exerted 
by the earth. He honed the plane to be as smooth as possible before he rolled 
the balls down it so that the earth’s power to attract the balls would not be 
adulterated by the power of friction to slow them down. The mechanism he 
devised allowed him to see the power’s canonical operation direct ly in the 
effect that actually happened. 
 
What Galileo learned would not be very interesting if the attraction of the earth 
on his rolling balls was not the operation of a power that recurs regularly in 
Nature, indeed in this case a power that we suppose that a system will have so 
long as it has a (gravitational) mass. We express our commitment to the 
universal association between the power of gravitational attraction and the 
independently identifiable feature of having a gravitational mass in what is 
called ‘the law of gravity’: Any object with a gravitational mass, say M, will 
attract another object with gravitational mass m a distance r away with a force 
GMm/r2. Having a universal law like this does not, however, commit us to the 
kinds of laws that start from the initial state of the world and fix everything in 
train. Even if the earth always pulls things down to it, we can fly our planes in 
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the air and affix magnets to our fridges by building the right kinds of 
mechanisms in which the effects of gravity are circumvented.  
 
It is important to note that Galileo’s rolling ball experiments allowed him only 
to observe the effects of the earth’s power of gravity acting on those balls.  
They did not provide him much evidence that the earth has had this power for 
a very long time and will continue to have it in the future, nor that the power 
affects not just balls but any massive object, nor any object with a mass can 
be relied on to possess this power.  These grander conclusions get their 
support from a vast web of experience, experiment and theorizing. I do not 
have any special thoughts about the usual histories of how this knowledge got 
stabilized except to urge that in appreciating the results we have been able to 
create and predict we not lose site of the mechanisms that make predictability 
possible, from the planetary system which gives rise to Kepler’s laws for the 
orbits of the planets to the intricate experimental arrangements that have 
recently been used to test the inverse square law of gravitational attraction at 
length scales shorter than a few millimetres, spurred on in part by the desire 
to look for quantum gravitational effects, which would only be significant over 
incredibly short distance scales.8  
 
Galileo worked hard to study the power of gravitational attraction acting on its 
own but often we can only manage to study what happens when powers act in 
consort. Then the job of inferring the canonical operation of any one of the 
powers is harder. But there’s no grand constraint of consistency here as there 
is when we try to read the laws of the universe from the regular behaviours of 
the parts. We can gain knowledge in physics in just the way we do and use it 
in just the way we do and no miracle form-matching is required.  
 
Powers affect what happens. Mechanisms make what happens predictable. And 
where we can’t predict, it may be no fault of our own. The setting just may not 
have the right structure to fix an outcome to predict; i.e., the setting may not 
constitute a nomological machine – an arrangement sufficient to fix what will 
happen.9 The earth will surely exert its gravitational pull on the 1000 mark 
note blown by the wind around St Stephen’s Square. That is certainly not 
enough to allow us to predict where the bill will go. Can God or Laplace’s 
demon predict it? One may postulate that the demon need only consult those 
universal laws and the precise initial conditions and then he will know what will 
happen to the bill. The more modest metaphysics of powers and mechanisms 
allows that even Laplace’s demon cannot predict what we cannot predict in this 
case since it allows that there may be no pre-set fact to predict. The power of 
                                                 
8 For a review of these cf "Tests of the Gravitational Inverse Square Law", E.G. Adelberger, B.R. Heckel and A.E. 
Nelson, Ann. Rev. Nucl. Part. Sci. 53, 77 (2003). (hep-ph/0307284)  
9 This possibility may not be allowed on every account of powers. Some for instance individuate powers by assuming 
that each power has a different complete profile of what will result from pairing it with any situation. This is not at all a  
necessary way to view powers. (Cf Causal laws, policy predictions and the need for genuine powers  
Nancy Cartwright plus the slightly modified account in Aristotelian powers: Without them, what would modern 
science do? Nancy Cartwright and John Pemberton ) 
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gravity is acting in a situation where there are no rules for how powers in that 
set-up combine.10 
 
Of course there are cases, many many cases, where accurate predictions are 
possible. It doesn’t even take Laplace’s Demon. We can do it. Most 
impressively we can use our laws of physics to make very precise predictions 
that are regularly borne out and to build very precise instruments that work as 
we expect (like lasers to operate on our eyes). It is these astounding 
predictions that provide our best reason to take our laws to be correct, or 
correct enough. Does this not argue for the universal rule of the laws we use to 
make these predictions?11  
 
No. Because the arrangements where the laws of a physics theory are seen to 
hold almost without adjustment are very special. They are mechanisms, 
arrangements of systems in which the following special condition holds: 
 
All the causes of the predicted effect are in the theory’s domain.  
 
So there are no causes of effect that we don’t know how to label within the 
theory. That I claim is how we should read the theoretical claims if we are to 
have solid empirical support for them, and without commitment to the far 
stronger claim that for every effect there is, at least in God’s great book if not 
in any of ours, some theory or set of theories that provides appropriate 
descriptions of all the causes of that effect, which can be plugged into laws to 
predict it.  After all, we cannot test the predictions of a theory by looking at 
situations where we have no idea of how to provide descriptions in the 
language of the theory for some significant causes since in that case we would 
not know what the theory should predict for those situations.  
 
One may object to this line of argument that I am too Positivistic, confusing 
truth with testability: I take the range across which a physics claim is true to 
be the range across which it can be tested. Yes, one of the reasons in favour of 
adopting this view is epistemic caution. It is all we need to account for the 
impressive successes of modern physics; why leap to believe in more? But it 
also has metaphysical modesty in its favour. If we can account for our 
empirical successes in physics with the constrained metaphysics of powers and 
mechanisms, why resort to a grandiose vision of a world of universal laws, 
total determination and predestination?  
                                                 
10 This will of course not be the case if we insist that all the causes of the bill’s motion in that set-up are genuine 
instances of forces and that forces always combine by vector addition. My argument here depends on this assumption: 
We can SAY that anything that pushes the bill around is a force and even assign that force a value by back calculation 
of what it ‘must’ be from the bill’s motion, having subtracted out the properly identified forces (like the pull of gravity) . 
But that claim is not justified until we can assign the back-calculated force to otherwise identified features of the 
situation by one of the properly evidenced bridge principle of mechanics (like the bridge principle that says that when 
another mass of size M is located a distance r from it, a mass of size m will experience a force GMm/r2 or the principle 
that says a charge q1 a distance r from a second charge q2 will experience a force εq1q2/r2). For the most part we cannot 
do this. This is a case of the kind described in the next paragraph of the text where not all the causes of a given effect 
(motion) which effect is in the domain of a theory are instances of causes assignable in the t heory.  
11 I am here setting aside the usual anti-realists worries since they are well rehearsed and generally orthogonal to the 
issue here of the range of governance of the laws.  
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Turn now to what coherence looks like on the powers/mechanism ontology I 
urge. Consider first the story about quantum physics. Every system eventually 
is in interaction with every other to some extent. Once two systems have 
interacted, barring genuine (not merely apparent) reduction of the wave 
packet neither will ever have a state of its own again. This leaves one big 
quantum state for the universe, to be evolved by whatever turns out to be the 
correct law of evolution.  
 
This presupposes that all these systems have quantum sates to begin with. But 
what about the view of Willis Lamb, who won the Nobel prize for discovering 
and explaining the Lamb shift and who also made considerable contributions to 
quantum optics and the theory of the laser? Lamb explained that it is very 
difficult to get a system into a quantum state.12 Of course Lamb could have 
meant a ‘known’ quantum state. But I doubt that. Lamb paid a great deal of 
attention to how to get systems into quantum states – using techniques 
backed up not primarily by quantum theory but by a hodge-podge of 
knowledge from various branches of classical physics, engineering and 
materials science. This fits with the ontology I urge of a great host of features 
in Nature associated with a great number of powers, many studied by our 
many different branches of learning, that relate to each other and interact in a 
great many different ways. Some especially nice arrangements of these will fix 
as an effect a quantum state. Most will not.  
 
As to the classical coherence I used as a second example, let us suppose that 
all systems with masses have the power to attract each other and exercise that 
power continuously. And let us suppose what seems to be the case from 
observing a host of successful predictions, that there are many arrangements 
in which we can predict, say, the acceleration of a system – maybe a 
cannonball or an electron – by combining the power of gravity with others that 
we have proper labels for (like the Coulomb power that charges have to attract 
and repel each other) using the laws of classical physics. We can allow that for 
very precise predictions it may be necessary to include the pull of the distant 
planets in the description of the mechanism that fixes the motion of the 
electron or the cannonball. But this will not generate one big system that is 
forced forward through time by the laws of motion, at least if I am right about 
the correct way to think of the range of our laws. 
 
Most of the systems that exert forces on our cannonball or electron are not 
themselves in the fortuitous kinds of arrangements where their own 
behaviours can be fixed by the laws of classical physics: A great many of the 
causes of their motion are not in the domain of those laws.  The laws have no 
idea what to do in response to these causes. Our cannonball and our electron, 
being massive objects, do pull on these systems so that what these systems 
do is different from what they otherwise would – that’s a result of allowing the 
power of gravitational attraction to be associated with all masses and to 
exercise at all times without interference. But what the systems actually do 
                                                 
12 Ref to his LSE lectures. Theer may be a ref in one of my books which are on my shelf. 
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may not be fixed. Once we countenance the modest metaphysics of powers 
and mechanisms, genuine contingency is possible in our world. 
 
  
 
 
 
PART V CONCLUSION 
 
Maybe what happens in Nature can all be explained by universal laws evolving 
the world from its initial conditions. But it would be very good luck to end up 
with the rich diverse partly ordered, partly dishevelled world that appears to 
us. The initial conditions would have to be very special and so too would the 
form of the laws.  
 
We can account for the successes of modern science with the far less sweeping 
metaphysics of powers and mechanisms, and as side benefit make inroads on 
some problems in theology, ontology and the epistemology of science as well. 
With this kind of metaphysics we can embrace contingency and take 
responsibility for creating a better order. 
  
 
